Corruption ROADS AND HIGHWAYS DEPARTMENT

Corruption ROADS AND HIGHWAYS DEPARTMENT
Corruption in the Selection of New Roads
The identification and selection of new roads to be constructed should be based on cost-benefit analysis, considering the availability of financial resources. In practice, such analysis is rarely done except in the case of donor-funded projects. The task of identifying new road projects has traditionally been "delegated" to ministers, members of parliament, bureaucrats, and the influential local elite, for whom the construction of a road is an effective means of buying future votes. Thus, many of the road projects which are taken up have very little to do with national or regional priority and availability of financial resources. Yet, neither the Planning Commission nor any other relevant agency raises any question about the justification of such "mandatory" projects.
Until a road completed, the project sponsors will often invoke the support of a minister or even the prime minister to successfully lobby for additional financial allocations, causing even more wastage of scare developmental funds. Sometimes pressure is brought upon divisional RHD officers who, under the government's administrative and financial rules, are authorised to write cheques on the government account without any limit.
Because of the large numbers in the implementation schedule, projects are rarely completed in time. When a particular stretch of a road is ultimately built and opened to traffic, repairs become necessary before the full length of the road is completed. Development funds are usually diverted for such repair work, with little regard to proper maintenance of accounts for such expenditure.
Corruption in Road Construction
Widespread corruption is involved in determining the path a new feeder road should follow. It is quite common for affected landowners to bribe junior level RHD officials or use of their political connections to change the course of a road. As a result, a road that had a straight alignment as per the original plan ends up with numerous bends.
After the commencement of civil work, RHD officials receive kickbacks from the contractors either a direct payment (usually a percentage of the contract value) at different stages of the job, or as a share of the contractor's surplus arising from an over-billed or fictitious or substandard contract work which was knowingly approved by the RHD engineers in the first place.
A common example of the second type is the frequent re-carpeting of roads. The annual re-carpeting which takes place in Bangladesh would not be required had the work been done according to RHD's written specifications. By producing sub-standard work, the contractors and the collusive RHD officials jointly ensure the continuity of future corrupt earnings.
Earthwork is another source of rampant corruption. Embankments of 6 to 8 feet height are often required to protect the road from flooding during the rainy season. Private contractors will usually make the road measurements just before the onset of the rainy season (March to June) and carry out earthwork during the rainy season when parts of the earthwork are washed away, making it impossible to verify the extent of the work. It is common practice for contractors to bill for trucked-in earth which involves a higher cost, when in fact the earth is usually dug up from the depressed areas on either side of the road. The windfall gains resulting from such fraudulent activities are pocketed by the contractor, who shares a part of it with the RHD executive engineer who certified the work and cleared it for payment.
Corruption in Engineering Supply and Repair Contracts
In engineering supply contracts (e.g. spare parts for ferries), original or genuine parts are never supplied. The contractor, after paying bribes to the RHD hierarchy, has to make some profit for himself after all. There would be nothing left if he purchased a genuine or new part. Sometimes, the contractor will purchase an original part - one which has been stolen from RHD stores with the connivance of the store-keeper. For repair works, most contracts end up is false or fictitious works since there is no physical supply involved. In some cases, the contract itself is fictitious. If the work is to be done outside of Dhaka, chances are even greater that no actual work or supply will take place.
The rates of bribe paid to the different levels of RHD officials are well established and known to all relevant parties. Deviations from the standard rates are the prerogative of the higher level officials. The total bribes paid by a contractor ranges from 37% to 47% of the gross contract value. The effective rate between 40% to 52% of the net contract value, after deduction of VAT and advance income tax.
Selection of Local Contractors
Local contractors are usually selected through covert negotiation, although records would show that a competitive bidding system, as required by government rules, was followed. Prior to the submission of bids, a tacit understanding between the RHD officials and the contractor syndicate on the allocation of contracts amongst contractors and the contract prices. Competitors do not object to such an arrangement, and wait obediently for their turn in some other contract.
Outside experts are rarely used for determining the volume of material and labour input, or for preparing the design specifications. As a result, the quantity of work budgeted for is usually much higher than actual requirements. Besides, few projects can be completed within the stipulated period for want of adequate resources. For such delays, contractors are compensated by increasing rates and in other forms providing additional benefits.
Corruption in Consulting Activities
Consultants pay, on average, 12 to 15% of their fee as bribe at the time of commissing of the contract. The money is divided between ministry officials, and the members of RHD's Technical Evaluation Committee. Interestingly, the corruption level in the RHD is judged to be "moderate" compared to other government departments. The RHD rate is usually between 2 and 6% of the consultant's fees, whereas in other departments, the rate is not only higher (up to 15%) but is applied to the sum of consultant fees plus out-of-pocket expenses. RHD is by far the largest user of consultants and the recipients of bribes apparently abide by the dictum of "not killing the goose that lays the golden egg".
Causes of Corruption in the RHD
• Centralisation of decision-making powers relating to the selection of consultants and construction firms for big projects in the hands of ministry officials, who are less accountable and controllable in comparison to RHD officials.
• The selection of locally-funded feeder road projects is not based on economic cost-benefit analysis, but on the relative political clout of a vested external group, composed of ruling party leaders, politicians and local elite.
• Lower level RHD officers have too much discretion to change the alignment of rural and feeder roads.
• Outside experts are rarely used to independtly determining the volume of material and labour input, or for preparing the design specifications. As a result, the quantity of work budgeted for is usually much higher than actual requirements.
• Senior RHD officials have too much discretion in the setting of micro criteria to be used in the evaluation of consulating firms.
• The technical evaluation comiitttee's report is not required to be published within any stipulated time period.
Reasons Why Corruption Continues
Although RHD has elaborate rules for proceeding against corrupt official, these procedures are seldom invoked. In the few cases when departmental action has been initiated, the accused officer was either let off completely or subjected to minor punishment. The reason behind such blatant unconcern is easy to understand since corruption has taken firm hold at each level in the RHD official hierarchy, reportedly starting at the very top.
Very few cases have been referred to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, since most of the officers who would make such a decision are themselves the beneficieries of corruption. Moves to control corruption from RHD controlling ministry are not forthcoming reportedly for the same reason.
Suggested Remedial Measures
• In foreign-aided projects, the concerned donor agency and RHD should jointly set down the micro-criteria to be used for technical evaluation.
• During technical evaluation, at least one representative of the donor should sit in as an observer in the Technical Evaluation Committee, to ensure that evaluation does not suffer from undue delay.
• The Evaluation Committee should not take cognisance of anonymous complaints made to the minister or the secretary. This is used as a blocking tool when committee decisions do not appear to be going the way of the interested party.
• The criteria for shortlisting or prequalification of consultants and contractors should be made public before final decision is taken.
• An investigation of possible collusion between consultants and RHD / ministry could start with an analysis of the contract award history, relating the findings to close familial or known business links between the key decision-makers and the consultants.
• Local government bodies should be handed the authority to plan and implement all feeder and regional roads, along with the power to raise matching funds for financing these projects.
• The Chief Engineer of the RHD should be selected on the basis of merit, not seniority.
• The cheque issuing authority of RHD should be revoked except in situation in situations of disaster management.
• Rooting out corrupting from the RHD is a long-term proposition. Any workable solution must include steps to drastically down-size RHD's present scope of activity. The aim of such down-sizing would be to limit RHD's main function to regulatory and policy-making roles, with all line work to be carried out be consultants.