Corruption in the power sector
Genesis of Corruption
Corruption in the power sector had not assumed serious proportion until after the independence of
As shame and remorse once attached to corruption gradually vanished and certain sections of employees became gradually emboldened under protection of their Collective Bargaining Agents, corruption spread to a wider sphere of BPDB's activities and cases once confined to only subordinate staff extended to certain sections of officers.
Payment of a small percentage of a bill to the accounts section by contractors has become standard practice and is now taken for granted. The same is the case of gratification required by junior officers for certifying measurements, recommending quoted rates for unscheduled works, and for higher level officers approving bills. Engagement of ghost labour in the master roll, particularly during an emergency, is fairly common. These types of corrupt transactions would be fairly common in most government agencies and departments. But however prevalent such petty corruption may be, it is the large scale corruption associated with BPDB's technical and commercial functions that has been eating away at the vitals of the organisation and hurting the economy and the society.
Corruption in Procurement
Top officials in the BPDB have hinted that major corrupt practices in large contracts take place "outside the organisation", which would seem to indicate the ministry level. None, however, denied the existence of minor vices at different levels of BPDB, a phenomenon which they felt was common to most development-oriented government departments that handled large construction and supply works. In contrast, Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA) officials suggested that corruption in procurement was not significant, while Rurual Electrification Board (REB) officials claimed that well-developed procurement procedures and effective supervision of their procurement system offered little scope for corruption.
The rate of corruption is generally thought to be between 15 to 20 % of the value of procurement contracts, although in limited cases it was reportedly as high as 30%. Illegal gratifications that are required to be paid are of three forms:
1. Payments for information, which could give a bidding contractor an edge in the bidding process. The amounts involved are usually small since junior grade officers and subordinate staffs are involved.
2. Payments for manipulating tender specifications to favour certain types or brands of plant and equipment or for influencing the evaluation criteria. Fairly senior officials are involved here and the process is more difficult and risky. Hence larger payments are involved.
3. Payments for recommendation and approval of contracts are very large and made to high level officers in the BPDB or the Ministry of Energy.
Senior BPDB officials have to put up with direct approaches from bidders during the evaluation stage, as well as disguised lobbying by influential people in government (e.g. late night telephonic dropping of hints). Even members of the Cabinet Purchase Committee, sitting in formal meetings, have been known to raise queries on matters not contained in the official files placed before them.
Corruption in Getting a Connection
Getting a electric connection from the BPDB or DESA is a very difficult process, involving hassles, delays and, for the average consumer, bribery. The application form for a service connection asks for details of property ownership, lease deeds, and, for industrial connections, clearance certificates from the fire department and the Health Division. It is easy to find faults in the dozen or so attachments, unless appropriate palms are greased. Six signatures of various BPDB officials are required for the approval (shortened from the previous thirty), while the time involved for moving the case from one office to another is inversely related to the amount of gratification paid.
A new domestic consumer may get away with paying between Taka 5,000 to 10,000, but a commercial or industrial connection would cost a lot more. For example, a small factory requiring a bulk low-tension connection of 45 KW capacity could easily spend Tk 50,000 or more. For small and medium enterprises, a connection "surcharge" of Tk 1,000 per KW is the norm. The ever-helpful BPDB or DESA employees offer their services for arranging new connections, thereby avoiding the hassle of doing the complete desk round. Very large high tension consumers have a much easier time of it, as they generally are influential persons. For them, bribing is mainly limited to paying baksheesh to working level people.
Causes of Corruption in BPDB
From the above discussion, the following factors emerge as the significant causes of corrpution within or connected with the BPDB:
- Centralisation of decision-making powers with respect to procurement of capital equipment in the hands of the political government, who are less accountable and controllable in comparison to BPDB officialdom.
- The acute shortage of generation capacity and consequent scarcity of electricity which has opened up many opportunities for corrupt transactions.
- Poor demand management which has resulted in very high tarriff rates for some classes of consumers.
- Consistent failure of successive governemts over the past 30 years to take effective action against beneficiaries and providers of stolen electric power.
- Over-manning and the growing power of politcally backed trade unions which support and profit from the corruption related to non-technical system loss, local contracts, etc.
- Unnecessarily stringent and lengthy procedures for getting a new connection.
Why Corruption Continues Unabated in BPDB
To deal with electricity theft, there simply is not enough special magistrate courts and mobile courts to handle the huge backlog of cases to prosecute. The few fines, disconnections and even imprisonment have not created any deterrent effect. Illegal consumers, whose lines have been disconnected, are able to re-establish the connection in no time, illegally of course. The rate of disposal of cases is very slow, with the magistrates and BPDB / DESA blaming each other for the delay. The vested interests are too strong as the scope for making illegal gains is considerable, both in terms of ease of operation and the money amounts involved.
There have been no significant anti-corruption drives within the BPDB nor any court actions against corrupt employees. On occassions, mid-level officers have been suspended from duty on suspicion of moral turpitude and financial irregularities. But most were re-instated for lack of evidence. Instances of departmental inquiries or disciplinary actions against lower grade employees are even rarer due to the supposed or real fear of retaliation by trade unions.
The network of BPDB officers and staff who have been consistently robbing DESA and BPDB with impunity, with the backing of so-called trade unions, has growth in strength over the last three decades. But no matter however powerful this corrupt group of petty thieves appear to be, they are no match for the forces at the government's disposal. Therefore, the obvious conclusion to be drawn is that an absolute lack of commitment and the absence of political will on the part of the government are nurturing the continuation of corruption. The maintenance of the status quo benefits many vested interests. Conscientious officers eventually fall in line with the system, some perhaps joining it, when they discover that the known culprits enjoy the protection of powerful godfathers, some of whom come in the guise of lawmakers.
Suggested Remedial Measures
Given the institutional hold of corruption within BPDB and DESA, radical changes and drastic measures will be needed to redress the situation. To date no government has demonstrated the political will to take on the powerful nexus composed of dishonest workers, corrupt officials in the agencies and the ministry, opportunist traders, lobby groups and most certainly political leaders. A government having the required political conviction might have considered the following options:
- Declare electricity generation, transmission and distribution as an essential service, and enact a law banning all trade unions in organisations involved with these functions for five years.
- Arrange sufficient funds for "golden handshakes" to all corrupt meter readers, bill clerks, and inefficient supervisors whose assets do not match their legal income in order to clean the slate in one go.
- Until new meter readers, bill clerks, and supervisors are appointed or alternative arrangements made, induct the help of non-commissioned army officers in meter reading and billing in order to establish a benchmark position.
- Convert all distribution organisations into limited companies with private sector participation and allow them to function as normal private companies without interference from the government.
- Establish a regulatory body to monitor, co-ordinate, regulate and facilitate the functions of all the power utility organisations and ensure that consumer rights are protected.
- Rationalise the staffing of utility organisations, revise salaries and allowances making them commensurable with the cost of living, provide employment on contract basis with the flexibility of hiring and firing.
- Conduct intensive training programmes for skill improvement in all important functions (BPDB's current training budget is a paltry 0.2% of the annual operating budget).
- Allow utility companies total freedom to handle own procurement without having to go to the ministry or the Cabinet Purchase Committee, with provision for regular external audits built into the system.
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